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Abstract
We construct a continuous sovereign debt crisis index for four large
Latin American countries for the period 1870–2012. Our sovereign
debt crisis index is similar to the Exchange Market Pressure Index for
currency crises, and the Money Market Pressure Index for banking
crises. To obtain the optimal set of indicators and the optimal value
of the threshold for dating crises we apply the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve. We calculate our sovereign debt crisis
index as a weighted average of three indicators, the debt to GDP ratio,
the external interest rate spread and the exports to imports ratio.
The continuous index allows a more advanced analysis of sovereign
debt crises. We include two applications. In the first application
we investigate the relationship between sovereign debt crises and the
business cycle in Latin America. Our second application constructs a
similar index for five European countries.
Keywords: sovereign debt crises, debt crisis index, Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve
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1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe has renewed interest in sovereign debt
crises. Until now the analysis of sovereign debt crises is limited by the crisis
indicator that is traditionally used, which is a binary variable to distinguish
debt default periods from non-debt default periods. This may be too re-
strictive in two ways. First, a continuous index is more informative, and
second, a more general definition of a debt crises that allows for debt servic-
ing difficulties—rather than a sovereign debt default index—may enhance the
usefulness of such an index. This paper proposes a continuous sovereign debt
crises index, where a debt crises, indicating market pressure, differs from a
debt default. The construction of the Debt Market Pressure Index (DMPI)
is our main contribution to the literature.
To construct a continuous index we combine indicators that show differ-
ent behavior in times of a debt crisis compared to normal times for the four
largest Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, for
the period 1870–2012. We have chosen these countries for their long his-
tory of sovereign debt crises. In fact, we construct two indices: one for a
“wide” definition of sovereign debt crises that includes debt servicing diffi-
culties (market pressure), and one for a “narrow” definition of sovereign debt
defaults.
When the DMPI is used a crisis indicator, it has to be combined with
a decision rule—a crisis is signaled when the index exceeds a threshold—
and compared to a benchmark crisis series. The threshold is determined by
the trade-off between missed crises and false alarms—each having its own
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cost. We apply the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to find
simultaneously the optimal set of indicators and the value of the threshold.
We find that for our sample of four Latin American economies over a long
time span the DMPI for debt crises that replicated best the benchmark debt
crisis series consists of debt-to-GDP, imports-to-exports, and external spread.
The best DMPI for debt defaults consists of debt-to-GDP and imports-to-
exports. The difference is the external spread indicator that does indicate
market pressure, but not debt default.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a review of
theoretical and empirical literature on sovereign debt crises in Section 2,
Section 3 describes the design of our new crisis index, weights and threshold.
The data are presented in Section 4, followed by the results in Section 5.
We present applications of our market pressure index in Section 6. Section
7 concludes.
2 Literature
Standard and Poor’s rates sovereign issuers in default if a government fails
to meet principal or interest payment on external obligation on due date, or
when a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is at less favorable terms than
the original obligation. This traditional definition of debt crises—focusing
on defaults—does not capture all debt-servicing difficulties.1 A country may
avoid a default through a large financial package from the IMF, as was the
case in Mexico and Argentina in 1995, and in Brazil in 1998–1999 and 2001–
1For example Moody’s did not report the default of Greece before 2012, despite Greece
having major debt servicing problems since 2010.
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2002. Therefore Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) extend the
debt crisis definition to account for large financial packages from the IMF
(see Appendix A). According to Sy (2003) and Pescatori and Sy (2007) the
relative low number of sovereign debt crises since the 1990s can partly be
attributed to the definition of debt crises. Default on debt was common
in the 1980s, but since bond markets developed strongly in the mid 1990s
the number of debt defaults has diminished, while numerous countries faced
difficulties in their debt servicing.
Our crisis identification procedure is based on the idea underlying the
Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) which was introduced by Girton
and Roper (1977), and used by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) to
identify currency crises. The EMPI not only captures significant currency
depreciations, but also periods where the exchange rate is under pressure, and
defended by depleting foreign reserves and/or increasing interest rates. Sim-
ilarly, we extend the traditional focus on sovereign debt default to sovereign
debt crises by including periods of debt servicing difficulties which puts a
pressure on the market for sovereign debt.
The indicators we select to construct the DMPI are based on the the-
oretical literature on sovereign debt crises, notably the sudden stop model
of Calvo (2003), and Arellano’s (2008) incarnation of the reputation model
of sovereign default of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). These models will be
discussed briefly below.2
2Another body of literature (for instance Minsky, 1986, and 1992) builds upon the ideas
of Keynes. This literature focuses on institutions and lack of control mechanisms. Only
when control mechanisms (i.e. regulation, interventions) are installed, the capitalist econ-
omy can be stable for a longer period, which allows institutional evolution and sustainable
economic growth. Control mechanisms are not static: controls and interventions become
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In the sudden stop model of Calvo (2003) a high government debt and
current account deficit financed by capital flows can trigger a sudden stop,
which can cause a balance of payment (BOP) crisis. In the case of debt
denominated in foreign currency (original sin), a depreciation of the currency
will increase the probability of a sovereign debt default.
Recently new versions of the seminal model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
were developed to cope with empirical evidence from emerging economies.
One of these new models is Arellano (2008): endogenous time-varying default
probabilities influence interest rate spreads, which affect economic output. In
booms debt is cheap and borrowing is abundant, and the trade balance is
negative. In recessions the probability of default increases, which increases
interest rates.
Recent empirical research on sovereign debt suggests that the debt-to-
GDP ratio is a strong indicator for sovereign defaults in emerging economies
(Manasse and Roubini, 2009; Furceri and Zdzienicki, 2012). Borensztein and
Panizza (2009) observe that credit ratings and external interest rate spreads
surge in the first years of a debt default. Another indicator is the current
account (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006), which typically reverses in times of a
debt crisis. Since the overall balance of payments (trade balance and capital
balance) must always be zero, a country that attracts large capital inflows
will necessarily run a trade deficit (Krugman 1996). A reversal in capital
flows is therefore always accompanied by an opposite reversal in the trade
balance.
less effective over time, as agents innovate to avoid restrictions on their profitable activi-
ties. These mechanisms are difficult to quantify, so in this paper we assume no changes in
regulation and interventions.
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Aiolfi, Cata˜o and Timmermann (2011) describe in a narrative way the
relation between sovereign debt crises and business cycle turning points for
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 1870-2004. We con-
tribute to the literature by applying our crisis index to analyse the relation
in a more formal way.
3 Method
To build a debt market pressure index (DMPI) we need to select indicators,
weights and thresholds similarly to the construction of an exchange mar-
ket pressure index for currency crises or a money market pressure index for
banking crises (see Appendix B).
3.1 Construction of the DMPI
We construct different debt crisis indices, with different combinations of in-
dicators suggested by the literature. All indicators are transformed when
required to avoid non-stationarity, and standardized per country.





X i3,t, with standard deviations σXi1,t , σXi2,t and σXi3,t resp. Index i refers to
the country (1 = Argentina, 2 = Brazil, 3 = Chile, 4 = Mexico), and t refers
to the observation (t = 1, . . . , T ). For the weights we follow Eichengreen et












The DMPI it ’s are pooled and standardized, such that we obtain a vector of
size 4T .
We construct two crisis indices:
• DMPI: “broad” definition—debt crises. Refers to defaults and debt
servicing difficulties that require significant IMF assistance.
• DMPI–: “narrow” definition—debt default. Refers to defaults only.
3.2 DMPI as a crisis indicator
The DMPI identifies periods with increased pressure on debt servicing. How-
ever, we have no benchmark that captures debt servicing difficulties. There-
fore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the continuous index as a crisis indicator
we convert the index into a binary variable such that we can compare our
index with a benchmark. If the index exceeds a pre-established threshold,
then a crises is signaled and the value of 1 is assigned to the binary variable,
and zero otherwise. The higher the threshold, the less exceedences are to
be expected. This will result in less false alarms (type I error), but also in
more missed crises (type II error). The optimal threshold depends on the
relative cost of the two error types. To determine the optimal threshold we
do a grid search over the interval [-2.5; 2.5] in steps of 0.1 times the stan-
dard deviation of the DMPI and we compare the crisis signals to a published
benchmark crisis indicator series.
For each country and each period the constructed crisis signal dummy is
compared with the benchmark crisis dummy. For each threshold we construct
a contingency table as in Table 1. Contingency tables can be constructed
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both for debt crises (the “broad” definition) and for debt defaults (the “nar-
row” definition).
Table 1: Contingency table of crisis realisations and model predictions (sig-
nals)
Realisation
Indicator (model) Crisis No crisis
Crisis n1 (TP) n2 (FP)
No crisis n3 (FN) n4 (TN)
Notes.
• n1: number of observations in which the model signals a crisis that actually took
place: correct crisis signals (TP: True Positive)
• n2: number of observations in which the model signals a crisis that did not take
place: false alarms (FP: False Positive)
• n3: number of observations in which the model does not signal a crisis that actually
took place: missed crises (FN: False Negative)
• n4: number of observations in which the model does not signal a crisis that did not
take place: correct non-crisis signals (TN: True Negative)
3.3 The ROC curve
In signal detection theory a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
is a graphical illustration of the performance of a binary classifier system as
its discrimination threshold is varied. The ROC curve was first developed
by electrical engineers and radar engineers during World War II for detect-
ing enemy objects in battlefields and was soon introduced to psychology to
account for perceptual detection of stimuli. One application in economics is
Berge and Jorda` (2011) to evaluate the performance of their business cycle
indicator. They argue that “. . . A major advantage of the ROC curve is that
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it is not tied to a specific loss function as it itself is a map of the entire
space of trade-offs for a given classification problem. The ROC curve can be
estimated non-parametrically and ROC-based summary statistics have large
sample Gaussian distributions that make formal inference convenient . . . ”
(Berge and Jorda`, 2011, p249) We apply the method to calibrate our crisis
index, and the threshold in the decision rule.
The Total Positive Rate (TPR), or ROC(c) is defined as n1/(n1 + n3),
i.e. the percentage of correct crisis predictions relative to the total number
of crises. The TPR depends on the threshold c. A high TPR means that
the model predicts the crises well, while a low TPR implies that the model
misses crises. TPR is also known as the sensitivity or recall rate, the power
of the test, or 1 minus the Type II error.
The other principal statistic indicator is the False Positive Rate (FPR),
or r(c), which is defined as the percentage of false alarms relative to the total
number of non-crisis years: n2/(n2 +n4). FPR equals 1 minus the specificity,
or the Type I error, the size of the test. A high FPR means that the model
predicts crises that do not take place, and a low FPR implies that the model
correctly does not predict a crisis. In the remainder of this paper we use
ROC and r to indicate the Total Positive rate and the False Positive Rate,
respectively.
Figure 1 displays a ROC curve. A completely random guess gives a point
along a diagonal line from the left bottom to the top right corner (the so-
called line of no-discrimination). Points above the diagonal represent good
classification results (better than random), points below the line poor results
(worse than random). The perfect classifier system has a TPR of 1, and a
8
FPR of 0. This means that the model shows 100% sensitivity (no missed
crises) and 100% specificity (no false alarms).
Figure 1: An ROC curve





















LA4 - ROC curve
There are various way to evaluate the predictions of binary variables: the
Area under the Curve, and as a special case the Youden index, and the utility
approach. We apply the utility approach for reasons that will be discussed
below.
AUROC
One of the methods to evaluate predictions of binary variables is the Area
Under the ROC (AUROC), calculated as the integral of the ROC curve. A
perfect classifier has an AUROC value of 1; a non-discriminant classifier has
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an AUROC value 0.5. The classifier that generates the highest AUROC is
considered best. Berge and Jorda` (2011) use this measure to evaluate the
classification of the business cycle.
The main advantage of the AUROC is its objectivity: there is no arbitrary
judgment on what weighs heavier—a false alarm or a missed crisis. However,
this is at the same time a disadvantage, because in reality missed crises may
be considered more important than false warnings (Lobo, Jimenez-Valverde
and Real, 2008).
Various refinements have been proposed among which Jorda` and Tay-
lor (2009) who extend the ROC with the argument that an indicator that
correctly classifies many events with low costs but misses a key event that
generates a devastating loss will be less desirable than an indicator that is
equally accurate on average but correctly classifies the large events. They
attach little weight to wrong signals when the costs are small; but when costs
are large they penalize classifiers for not picking events, and reward classi-
fiers for picking events. We assume that missed crises have higher costs than
false alarms, and correctly predicting crises is more important than correctly
predicting periods of tranquility.
Youden index
The Youden index is a special case of the AUROC. In 1884, Charles Sanders
Peirce introduced a measure for evaluating predictions of a binary outcome:
“the science of the method ” (Baker and Kramer, 2007). The Youden index
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(Youden, 1950), as it was baptized, is defined as
J ≡ ROC − r = sensitivity + specificity− 1.
The optimal point is found were J is maximized, which corresponds to the
point on the ROC curve that maximizes the vertical distance between the
ROC curve and the diagonal.
Utility
To determine the combination of indicators and the threshold that generate
the best possible outcome we may also turn to a utility function. This method
was first introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1884 (Baker and Kramer,
2007). After assigning utility values to correct and incorrect model outcomes,
we compute the overall utility of the classification
U(r) = U11ROCpi + U01(1−ROC)pi + U10r(1− pi) + U00(1− r)(1− pi), (2)
where Uij is the utility associated with prediction i, given the true state
j; U11 is the utility of a correctly predicted crisis; U01 is the utility of a
missed crisis; U10 is the utility of a false alarm; and U00 is the utility of a
correctly predicted non-crisis episode; and pi is the unconditional probability
of observing a crisis.
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The utility is maximized by taking the first derivative of the utility func-










So, the optimum is the point where the slope of the ROC curve equals the
expected marginal rate of substitution between the net utility of accurate
non-crisis and crisis prediction. If the ROC curve is continuous and concave,
the optimum is the point where the slope of the ROC curve equals s. More
generally, the optimum on the ROC curve is the point on the ROC curve
that intersects the line with slope s that has the largest intercept and hence
the largest utility for that slope (Baker and Kramer, 2007).
If the loss-to-profit ratio (U00 − U10)/(U11 − U01) is large or the outcome
rare (pi small), the slope will be steep and the optimal operating point will
occur at a small value of FPR. This is the case when false alarms are relatively
expensive compared to missed crises. If the loss-to-profit ratio is smaller or
the outcome is more common, the slope will be less steep and the optimal
operating point will occur at a larger FPR value. This is the case when
missed crises are relatively ‘expensive’ compared to false alarms.
4 Data
We use an unbalanced panel consisting of four large Latin American economies
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) for the period 1870 up to and including
2012.
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For crisis indicators we use annual data from a variety of sources: debt
to GDP ratio (from Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010), external spread, inflation,
government expenditure increases, fiscal budget, nominal interest rate, terms
of trade, and ratio of exports to imports (all from Aiolfi et al., 2011), and
polity2, a dummy variable that captures the political system on a scale of
+10 (full democracy) to -10 (autocracy) drawn from Polity IV, Center for
Systemic Peace. All series are standardized.
The external spread series is incomplete. We replace missing data by
inflation as suggested by Manasse and Roubini (2009) and Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) especially for emerging markets, and especially after 1940—
which is the start of the period when the bond market is not used (until
the 1990s). Visual inspection of the combined series (external spread and
inflation) shows no signs of structural breaks. The debt to GDP ratio is
based on total gross central government debt, which consists of both external
and domestic debt. We use this series as a proxy for the foreign currency
sovereign debt. Appendix C contains details on data sources.
To determine the accuracy of the DMPI we compare the model’s crisis
signals with reported benchmark crisis dummies:
• DMPI (debt crises index): the benchmark consists of the debt de-
faults according to Standard and Poor’s, as reported in Borensztein
and Panizza (2009), complemented with IMF large financial assistance
packages (Manasse and Roubini, 2009). (column (3) in Table 2).
• DMPI– (debt defaults index): the benchmark consists of debt defaults
according to Standard and Poor’s (column (1) in Table 2).
13
For both benchmarks we use an exclusion window of two years, which implies
that debt crises with two years intervals or shorter are considered the same
crisis.


























Note. Descriptions of the definitions can be found in Appendix A.
5 Results
For the DMPI index both the utility and the Youden index select the same
combination of indicators as the optimal one: the external interest spread,
the debt-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of exports to imports. The selected
indicators are confirmed by the sudden stop model: a high debt-to GDP ratio
makes a country vulnerable for debt crises, and the current account reverses
when a crisis unfolds. External spread increases in times of debt crises,
which is in accordance with Arellano (2008). Government expenditures, the
fiscal budget, the terms of trade, and (changes in) the political system do
not contribute to a better performance of the debt crisis indicator. For the
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four countries Figure 2 shows the DMPI and the benchmark crisis dummy.
The benchmark crisis dummy is 1 if there is a debt crisis according to the
“broad” definition. A peak in the DMPI implies increased pressure on the
debt servicing. We can see that our debt crisis indicator shows peaks at the
time of the debt crises, except the Mexican debt crisis in the 1930s. We also
observe that our indicator has peaks that are not associated with debt crises,
such as Argentina in the 1940s and Chile in the 1970s.
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In the overall utility of the classification as shown in Equation (2) in
Section 3.3 we use U11 = 1, U00 = 1, U10 = −1, and a range for U01:
−1,−2,−3, . . . ,−10. The motivation behind this non-symmetric treatment
is that we assume that missed crises are more costly than false alarms. The
more negative U01, the more a missed crisis is punished compared to false
alarms. Figure 3 shows the utility value for different values of U01.
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Figure 3: DMPI: Utility (vertical axis) under different penalty values for
















Choosing the penalty for missed crisis is arbitrary. We apply two criteria:
(i) the threshold should not be negative, and (ii) the cost of a missed crisis
should be higher than the cost of a false alarm.
We find two optimal thresholds for different penalties for a missed crisis:
1. Mild penalty for missed crises (U01 = -2): the optimal threshold is 0.5
times the standard deviation. This results in the following contingency
table.
Realisation
DMPI index (model) Crisis No crisis
Crisis 93 (17.0%) 45 (8.2%)
No crisis 39 (7.1%) 370 (67.6%)
2. Strong penalty for missed crises (U01 = -4, -5): the optimal threshold
is 0.1 times the standard deviation.
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Realisation
DMPI index (model) Crisis No crisis
Crisis 120 (21.9%) 107 (19.6%)
No crisis 12 (2.2%) 308 (56.3%)
Comparison of the contingency tables shows that increasing the threshold
decreases the number of false alarms, but at the cost of an increase in the
number of missed crises. The performance of DMPI against the benchmark
for debt crises is shown in Table 3. Column (2) lists the identified debt crises
for a relatively high penalty for missed crises, and column (3) for a relatively
mild penalty for missed crises.
In our analysis of the results we will focus on a threshold of 0.5 (the
last column of Table 3). The crisis signals are to a large extent similar to
the published benchmark crisis dummies (the combination of S&P and IMF
assistance). Our index does not miss any crisis period, although in various
crises our constructed dummy does not identify the entire debt crisis period;
particularly the first years of the Mexico 1928–1942 crisis are not picked up.
The false alarms occur in periods with high volatility in the region or ma-
jor political events. The sovereign debt crisis in Argentina in 1890 (Barings
crisis) caused increased pressure from international investors on the entire
region, including Brazil. In the late 1890s Brazil experienced a debt crisis
which affected Argentina and Chile. With the dip in international trade af-
ter the outbreak of WW I Chile suffered as its primary commodity (nitrate)
had become obsolete and was only slowly replaced by copper. Turmoil in
revolutionary Mexico and a debt crisis in Brazil also contributed to the sit-
17




Argentina — 1876 —
Argentina 1890-1893 1891-1903 1891-1894, 1899-1902
Argentina — 1915 —
Argentina — 1932-1937 —
Argentina — 1941-1946 1943-1945
Argentina — 1975-1979 1976-1978
Argentina 1982-1995 1982-1991, 1995 1982-1991
Argentina 2001-2005 2001-2012 2001-2012
Brazil — 1889-1890 1889-1890
Brazil 1898-1910 1898-1909 1900-1905, 1909
Brazil 1914-1919 1914-1916 1914-1915
Brazil — 1922-1923 —
Brazil 1931-1933, 1937-1943 1930-1945 1931-1945
Brazil 1983-1994, 1998-2002 1981-2006 1982-2005
Chile 1880-1883 1878-1882 1879-1880
Chile — 1898-1899 1898
Chile 1931-1947 1915-1950 1915-1917, 1931-1946
Chile — 1969-1977 1973-1976
Chile 1983-1990 1983-1991 1983-1988
Mexico — 1896-1897 —
Mexico 1914-1922 1909-1927 1913-1918, 1924
Mexico 1928-1940 1931-1943 1934-1935, 1943
Mexico 1982-1990 1982-1990 1982-1989
Mexico 1995 1995-1999 1995-1996
uation in Chile. In Argentina a period of frauds in the 1930s was followed
by revolutionary reforms in the Peronist era starting in 1943. In the mid
1970s both Argentina and Chile experienced military coups, started market
reforms experiments and suffered from (very) high inflation (Ocampo and
Ros, 2009).
We now turn to the debt default index, DMPI–. Both the utility and the
Youden index select the same optimal combination of indicators: the debt-to-
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GDP ratio and the ratio of exports to imports. Compared to the debt crisis
index DMPI, the external spread does not play a significant role any more.
This confirms the findings of Pescatori and Sy (2007), because the additional
crisis periods (IMF assistance) occur since the mid 1990s when emerging
countries enter the international capital markets and the defaults diminish,
while debt service difficulties do not decrease. The optimal threshold is 0.2
times the standard deviation—for penalties for missed crises (U01) between
-2 and -10. The contingency table reads3
Realisation
Indicator (model) Crisis No crisis
Crisis 84 (15.4%) 133 (24.3%)
No crisis 48 (8.8%) 282 (51.6%)
6 Applications
An advantage of a continuous index as opposed to a binary variable is that
more information is included in the index. Furthermore, it enables testing for
endogeneity or causality between sovereign debt crises and economic growth
and/or business cycles, and between sovereign debt crises and currency and
banking crises. We also see opportunities to use the DMPI indices in Early
Warning System approaches. We discuss two applications of our continuous
sovereign debt crisis index. As a first application we analyse the relation
between business cycles and sovereign debt crises for four Latin American
countries, and show impulse response functions based on a two-variable VAR
3The performance of DMPI– with a threshold of 0.2 is comparable to the performance
of DMPI with a threshold of 0.1. There is a great overlap in crisis and default periods.
Results available upon request.
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model. Granger causality tests indicate that the business cycle Granger-
causes debt crises at the 5% significance level.
In the second illustration we apply the methodology of constructing a
DMPI—using the same indicators as we do for the Latin American countries—
to a number of European countries that face sovereign debt problems some
years after the burst of the housing bubble in the United States in 2007.
To do this we select the same indicators as we do for the Latin American
countries. Our index shows a sharp increase for Portugal, Ireland and Greece
after 2008, which are the countries that received assistance from the IMF and
the ECB.
6.1 Sovereign debt crises and business cycles
As mentioned in the Introduction an advantage of a continuous index as
opposed to a binary variable is that it enables additional analysis, e.g. test-
ing for endogeneity or causality between sovereign debt crises and economic
growth and/or business cycles, and between sovereign debt crises and cur-
rency and banking crises. We perform an econometric analysis for the rela-
tion between debt crises and the short business cycle indicator of Aiolfi et
al. (2011) as shown in Figure 4. We did not update the indicator, so the
comparison is for the period 1870 until and including 2004. We determine
the DMPI for this shorter time horizon and find that the same combination
of indicators performs best in resembling its benchmark. For the threshold
we choose 0.4 times the standard deviation, which corresponds to a mild
penalty for missed crises: the cost of a missed crisis is two to three times the
20
cost of a false alarm. The correlation coefficient between the business cycle
indicator and the DMPI is -0.388.
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Business Cycle Index
To gain more insight in the relationship between the debt crisis index
(DMPI) and the business cycle (BCS) we construct a VAR and analyse the
impulse response functions (i.e. responses to one unit reduced form innova-
tions) derived from the moving average or Wold representation of the reduced
form model. The number of lags based on the likelihood ratio test is eight,
which is about the average length of a sovereign debt crisis.4
The two-variable VAR with eight lags is stable which implies that the
impulse response functions are valid. According to the block exogeneity Wald
4Experimenting with different lags, or including exogenous variables like the US long-
term interest rate and US real GDP growth yields similar impulse response functions.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions for DMPI and the business cycle index
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Response of DMPI to DMPI
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
(Chi-square) test Granger causality is uni-directional at a level of significance
of 5%. Accordingly, we assume that contemporaneous Granger causality runs
from business cycle index disturbance to a debt crisis index disturbance and
not the other way around (this implies a recursive order on the reduced form
disturbances, also known as a Cholesky decomposition).
Figure 5 shows that a one standard deviation shock to BCS lowers DMPI
for two periods, and this increases DMPI in periods 4-7. So, a positive shock
to economic activity reduces the probability of a debt crisis for two years.
After about four periods the debt crisis index increases while at the same
time the business cycle experiences a downturn. A one standard deviation
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shock to the DMPI lowers BCS in the second period after the shock, and
remains unchanged thereafter. The DMPI itself slowly returns to neutral.
Figure 6: Impulse response functions for DMPI and the business cycle index
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Response of DMPI to DMPI
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
According to the Granger causality test Granger causality is bi-directional
at a 10% level of significance, so we present a sensitivity analysis with a
reversed Cholesky ordering in which contemporaneous Granger causality runs
from debt crisis index disturbance to a business cycle index disturbance. The
impulse responses are shown in Figure 6.
Reversing the Cholesky ordering leads to the conclusion that a one stan-
dard deviation shock to BCS increases DMPI after the second period. The
increase in the debt crisis index shock peaks in period seven when the econ-
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omy is in a downturn. A one standard deviation shock to DMPI lowers BCS
in the first two periods, but this response is short-lived.
6.2 What about Europe?
In the Introduction we mentioned that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe
has renewed interest in sovereign debt crises. So, what can we learn from
our analysis for Europe? The selection of indicators and the estimation of
the threshold that signals a crisis is based on the rich history of debt crises
in Latin America. Applying the same methodology to European countries is
difficult because European countries have had only a few debt crises in the
past. This implies that we can not use the utility approach to determine the
selection of indicators simultaneously with the threshold. However, we can
construct a DMPI for European countries—as in Equation (1)—assuming
that the same indicators play a role as in Latin American countries. These
indicators are debt-to-GDP, imports-to-exports, and the external spread.
To illustrate what this European DMPI looks like in the period 1992–
2012, and whether the index shows an increase after 2008, we calculate the
standards deviation of the indicators for the period 1992–2007. In this way
the weights are not affected by the current crisis episode. The countries
we have selected are the four weakest countries in the periphery of Europe,
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, and Ireland. Three countries, notably
Greece in the period 2010–2012, and Ireland and Portugal in the period
2011–2012 needed assistance from the IMF and the ECB.
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Figure 7 shows the debt crisis indexes for these countries.5 The European
DMPIs are generally higher than the Latin American DMPIs as shown in
Figure 2 for at least two reasons. First, the weights of the indicators, i.e. the
standard deviations, are much lower because the 1992–2007 period in Europe
shows less volatility than the 1870–2012 period in Latin America. Second,
towards the end of the period all three indicators move in the same direction
in European countries, whereas before the GFC high values of two indicators
are typically off-set by changes in the third indicator.









Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain
5Sovereign debt for these European countries is measured in domestic currencies. We
compared the 10 year government bond yield with the German government bond yield.
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The graph clearly shows that the index signals debt servicing problems in
three out of five countries, namely Portugal, Ireland and Greece. These are
the same countries that indeed needed assistance. In Portugal and Greece
the index drops in 2012, whereas in Portugal it is increasing. In Italy and
Spain the index also increases, but the level is much lower than in the other
three countries. Therefore, the same indicators that have been identified to
be important for debt servicing problems in Latin America also seem to be
relevant for the European countries.
7 Conclusion
We construct a continuous sovereign debt crisis index for four large Latin
American countries for the period 1870–2012, similar to indices for currency
crises, and more recently for banking crises. Applying the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve we determine the optimal sovereign debt crisis
index and the threshold. For a “broad” definition of a debt crisis (DMPI)
the optimal combination is debt-to-GDP ratio, external interest rate spread,
and exports-to-imports ratio. The benchmark for this index consists of de-
fault according to Standard and Poor’s, complemented by periods when IMF
assistance was required. The optimal threshold is 0.5 times the standard
deviation when missed crises have a relatively lower cost (defined as 2 times
the costs of a false alarm), or 0.1 when missed crises have a relatively high
cost (defined as 4 to 5 times the costs of a false alarm). For a “narrow”
definition of a debt crisis (DMPI–) the optimal combination is debt-to-GDP
ratio, and exports-to-imports ratio. The benchmark for this index is default
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as defined by Standard and Poor’s. The optimal threshold is 0.2 times the
standard deviation.
The indicators we select are similar to the ones that feature in the models
of Arellano (2008) and Calvo (2003). The probability of default is positively
correlated with the interest rates, and thus interest rate spread. In sudden
stops, debt-to-GDP ratio tend to be high. This debt overhang will remain
high until the debt is restructured, which typically last long. Furthermore,
in a sudden stop capital inflows reverse, which is reflected by an increase in
exports relative to imports.
The DMPI index performs well in terms of missed crises: it does not
miss any debt crisis period, although in various crises our constructed crisis
dummy does not identify the entire debt crisis period. Our index generates
many false signals, yet all these periods can be traced down to high volatility
in the region (debt crises in neighboring countries), sharp drops in commodity
prices or major political events (military coups).
In this paper we illustrate the relationship between the business cycle
index and the debt crisis index in a two-variable VAR model. The impulse
responses show that a positive shock to economic activity reduces the prob-
ability of a debt crisis for two years.
As a second illustration we show that using the same indicators that
have been selected for Latin American countries indicate that for Portugal,
Ireland and Greece the index sharply increased after 2008. These countries
indeed experienced a sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011. For Spain and
Italy the sovereign debt crisis index also increases, but the level in the period
2010–2012 is much lower compared to Portugal, Ireland and Greece.
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A Debt crisis definitions6
• Moody’s defines a default when (i) a missed or delayed disbursement of
interest and/or principal, even if the delayed payment is made within
the grace period; or (ii) when the issuer offers a new security that leads
to a diminished financial obligation (e.g. lower coupon or par value).
• Standard and Poor’s rates sovereign issuers in default if a government
fails to meet principal or interest payment on external obligation on
due date, or when a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is at less
favorable terms than the original obligation.
• Beim and Calomiris (2001) define a crisis when all or part of interest
and/or principal payments due were reduced or rescheduled. They
consider bonds, supplier’s credit, and bank loans to sovereign nations
and exclude intergovernmental loans.
• Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) define a debt crisis if (i) there are
arrears of principal or interest on external obligations towards commer-
cial creditors (banks or bondholders) of more than 5 percent of total
commercial debt outstanding; or (ii) there is a rescheduling or debt re-
structuring agreement with commercial creditors as listed in the World
Bank’s Global Development Finance.
• Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) not only consider as
a debt crisis outright default, but also situations where default was
avoided through the provision of large scale official financing by the
6This section is partially based on Pescatori and Sy (2007).
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IMF. They define a debt crisis if (i) Standard and Poor’s definition of
a debt default, or (ii) if the country receives a large non-concessional
IMF loan, defined as access in excess of 100 percent of quota.
• Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) define a country default if one of five con-
ditions occur, including the receipt of a large assistance package from
the IMF, and a debt restructuring or rescheduling agreement with an
official and/or commercial creditor. In most, but not all cases, restruc-
turings occur after a default, but it is also possible that a restructuring
occurs prior to a probable default, which is labeled as a “preemptive
debt restructuring” (Das et al. , 2012).
• In Sy (2003) a debt crisis occurs when bond spreads are trading 1,000
basis points or more above U.S. Treasuries. The threshold is chosen
as it is considered a psychological barrier for investors. The problem
is that the data do not always fit this rigid definition: some Asian
countries did not even exceed the threshold in the Asia crisis, while
various Latin American countries exceed the threshold also in tranquil
times. As an alternative, they take the 90th percentile, acknowledging
that countries without debt problems will also be included.
• Pescatori and Sy (2007) define debt crises as events occurring when
either a country defaults or when its bond spreads are above a criti-
cal threshold. For the critical threshold they use a rate of 1,000 basis
points, based on Extreme Value Theory and the Kernel Density esti-
mation, with the 90th percentile of the fitted distribution.
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B Currency and banking crisis indicators
Currency crises: Exchange Market Pressure Index
Based on the Girton and Roper (1977) model, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1995) develop an Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) based on changes
in the nominal exchange rate, foreign currency reserves and interest rates—

























where i refers to country i, t refers to time, ∆ is the difference operator, e is
the nominal exchange rate, rm is the ratio of foreign reserves to M1, r is the











r − rUS) respectively. The index US is the reference
country, in this case USA.
When the index exceeds a predetermined threshold (two standard devi-
ations above the mean), then a crisis is identified. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) made an adjusted version, and later various variations emerged (for
an overview see Lestano and Jacobs, 2007).
Banking crises: Money Market Pressure Index
Von Hagen and Ho (2007) develop a similar index, to capture banking crises.
This Money Market Pressure Index (MMPI) is based on changes in the
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where i refers to country i, t refers to time, ∆ is the difference operator, rd
is the ratio of central bank reserves to total bank deposits, s is the short-
term real interest rate, σ∆rd and σ∆s are the standard deviations from ∆rd
and ∆s respectively. To identify a banking crises Von Hagen and Ho (2007)
use two criteria: the MMPI exceeds the 98.5 percentile of the sample for
the country under study, and the increase of the MMPI compared to the




Exports Exports, in millions of USD 1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012: IFS
Imports Imports, in millions of USD 1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012: IFS
(Brazil and Mexico: 1948-2012: IFS)
Export volume Exports volume index, 2000 = 100 1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012: IFS
(Argentina and Brazil), growth from
WDI (Chile and Mexico)
Import volume Imports volume index, 2000 = 100 1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012: IFS
(Argentina and Brazil), growth from
WDI (Chile and Mexico)
Terms of trade Terms of trade, index: 2000 = 100 1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012:
calculation: ToT = [exports / export
volume] / [imports / import volume]
Inflation Consumer Price Inflation (CPI),
annual, geometric change
1870–2003: ACT2011, 2004–2012: IFS
External spread Interest difference between USA and
domestic government; difference in
yield on 10 year government bonds
denominated in USD





Government expenses, in constant
1995 local currency; index: 1995 = 100
1870–2004: ACT2011, 2005–2012:
WEO (adjusted for structural break)
Government
revenues
Government revenues, in constant
1995 local currency; index: 1995 = 100
1870–2004: ACT2011, 2005–2012:
WEO (adjusted for structural break)
Gross debt to
GDP
Central government (external and
domestic) debt to GDP
1870–2009: RR2011, 2010–2012:
Ministerio de Economia (Argentina),
Tesouro Nacional (Brazil), Banco de
Chile (Chile), Secretaria de Hacienda
y Finanzas Publicas (Mexico)
Polity2 Polity2 index: -10 (autocracy) to +10
(democracy)
1870–2012: Polity IV project, Center
for Systemic Peace
BC index Business Cycle Indicator 1870–2004: ACT2011
Notes:
ACT2011: Aiolfi, Cata˜o and Timmermann (2011)
IFS: International Financial Statistics, from IMF
RR2011: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
WDI: World Development Indicators, from WB
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